American students study harder in college than in high school while East Asian students study harder in high school than in college. This paper proposes a signaling explanation. Signaling may occur over time both in high school and in college, and societies may di¤er in the timing of signaling. Students work harder in the signaling stage determined by the society as a whole. A testable implication is that high ability workers in East Asia are more concentrated among a few colleges than their US counterparts. This implication is con…rmed by top CEO
Introduction
American students study harder in college than in high school while East Asian students study harder in high school than in college. Time use surveys show that average American students study 4.6 hours per week in high school and 9.4 hours in college while average Korean and Japanese students study 14 Juster and Sta¤ord (1991) ). American students more than double their study hours in college while Korean and Japanese students decrease their study hours to less than a half.
Why do American students study more in college than in high school while East Asian students study more in high school than in college? This paper proposes a signaling explanation for this puzzle and provides its empirical evidence. It builds on the ideas of Spence (1973) . The main point of departure is that signaling can take place over time both in high school and in college, and that societies may di¤er in when the signaling takes place. Students work harder in the signaling stage determined by the society as a whole.
I build a two-stage signaling model and show that there exist two equilibria. In one equilibrium named Asian equilibrium, signaling takes place in high school and students work harder in high school than in college. In this equilibrium, …rms believe that college names signal workers'abilities better than college GPAs and this makes students study harder in high school; as students compete harder to enter better colleges, college names actually become better signals of workers'abilities.
In the other equilibrium named US equilibrium, signaling takes place in college and students work harder in college than in high school. Firms believe that college GPAs signal workers' abilities better than college names and this makes students study harder in college; as workers compete harder to achieve better GPAs, college GPAs actually become better signals of workers'abilities.
My model generates two di¤erent kinds of explanations for why societies might have di¤erent signaling stages. The …rst explanation is a multiple-equilibria argument. My model shows that the two equilibria with di¤erent signaling stages coexist under certain conditions. Thus, two societies with identical fundamentals can have di¤erent signaling stages, and the signaling stage is selected only by the society's self-ful…lling belief. The second explanation is based on the di¤erences in fundamentals between societies. The model shows that signaling is more likely to take place in high school if college-alumni networks are more important for job performance. A case can be made that this condition is more true for East Asian countries.
The theory also delivers a testable implication I can examine with data. If college names are better signals of workers'abilities in East Asia than in the US, high ability workers in East Asia have to be more concentrated among a few top colleges than their counterparts in the US. I examine this implication by looking at college distribution of the largest …rms'CEOs in the US and Korea.
These top CEOs are clearly high ability workers, and I …nd that the CEOs in Korea are substantially more concentrated among a few top colleges than the CEOs in the US. For example, 48 percent of the Korean CEOs are from Seoul National University, which accounts for just 0.4 percent of all college students. In contrast, a group of top US colleges, which accounts for the same percentage of college graduates, produces only 19 percent of the US CEOs.
My theory has implications for two important issues. The …rst issue concerns the debate over the causes of the mediocre performance of American high school students. It is a well documented fact that the high school performance of American students is not as good as that of their East Asian counterparts. For example, in a recent study by OECD (2000), American 15-year-olds were ranked 14th in science while Koreans ranked 1st and Japanese 2nd. While many factors may contribute to the mediocre performance of American students, undoubtedly one part of the explanation is simply that American high school students are not studying as hard as their East Asian counterparts.
My theory implies a trade-o¤ between high school and college education performance, the levels of performance depending on when signaling takes place. If signaling were to occur in high school as in East Asia, US students would work more in high school and their high school performance would improve, but they would work less in college and their college performance would decline.
The mediocre performance of US high school students may then not be as bad as it looks, for it is one of the reasons US higher education performance is so excellent.
The second issue concerns education productivity estimation literature that uses international test data for high school students (e.g., Heyneman and Loxley (1983) , Hanushek and Luke (2001) ).
These studies examine the e¤ect of di¤erent education systems on student performance. Any productivity study needs to control for all inputs, and in education one input is clearly how hard students are studying. Any di¤erences in signaling stage can lead to di¤erences in study time and this may bias estimates if not properly controlled. For example, these studies conclude that public education expenditure does not matter much for high school students'performance. Part of what drives this result is that most East Asian countries belong to the low spending group and yet their high school students do so well (See Woesmann (2003) ). If their excellent performance is at least partly due to signaling occurring in high school, the coe¢ cient for education expenditure will be underestimated.
There is a huge signaling literature following the seminal work of Spence (1973) , generalized in many ways including signaling with many signals (e.g., Quinzii and Rochet (1985) , Engers (1987) , Cho and Sobel (1990) ) and repeated signaling (e.g., Cho (1993) , Milgrom and Roberts (1982) , Kaya (2005) ). This paper di¤ers from the previous literature in that there is a group externality in signaling: one has to signal one's ability in the signaling stage determined by the society as a whole.
For example, if signaling occurs in high school so that high and low ability workers are completely separated into di¤erent colleges, a high ability worker who deviates to a low ability college would not be able to signal his true ability in the college. Firms would believe that he is a low ability worker regardless of his college GPA.
Another novel feature of my model is that workers signal their abilities through their ranks: they choose performance levels in high school and in college but …rms observe only their ranks in schools. This is a reasonable assumption because grades are often determined by students'relative ranks, not by their absolute performance. The role of this rank signaling assumption in the model is to limit the ranges of signaling variables (i.e., performances in high school and college) that are observable to …rms and thus to prevent each worker from freely choosing his signaling stage.
Di¤erent equilibria have di¤erent observable ranges of the signaling variables across the signaling stages.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes equilibria in colleges and job market. Section 4 characterizes equilibria in high school and …nds su¢ cient conditions under which each equilibrium exists. Section 5 presents a simulation result.
Section 6 provides empirical evidence. Section 7 discusses other explanations for the puzzle. Section 8 concludes.
The Model
In this section I present the model of workers signaling their abilities both in high school and in college. Each worker decides how much to study in each school and which college to attend. There are three ability types of workers and two colleges, and this provides a minimal setting where signaling can take place both in high school and in college. There is a networking e¤ect in colleges that improves workers'productivity by a fraction of average student ability in the college. The networking e¤ect coe¢ cient is the key parameter of the model, deciding which type of equilibrium exists. Colleges admit workers based on their ranks in high school performance, and …rms observe each worker's college name and rank in the college and make wage o¤ers based on these two signals.
Workers
Workers di¤er in two characteristics: innate ability and disutility of studying in high school. There are three ability types represented by Each worker goes to high school and college, and the following utility function describes their preferences:
and n h ; n c ; w 2 R + , where w is wage, and n h and n c are the time spent studying in high school and college respectively.
The study disutility function v : R + ! R is negative valued, strictly decreasing, twice di¤eren-tiable, strictly concave, and satis…es the property that lim n!1 v(n) = 1 and v (n) = 1 for n 1. This property implies that no worker studies more than a unit measure of time either in high school or in college.
Note that study disutility increases in when study time is …xed. The heterogeneity in captures variation among students other than their innate abilities. For example, disutility coe¢ cient would be high for those who just hate studying or do not have good educational environments.
In this model, the heterogeneity in interferes with e¤ective sorting in high school and allows an equilibrium where some high ability workers end up in a bad college. I assume for simplicity that there is no heterogeneity in disutility of studying in college.
Stage 1: High School
Each worker decides how much time to spend studying in high school. High school performance p h depends on workers'ability and study time. For simplicity I assume a linear performance function:
Stage 2: Colleges
There are two colleges -A and B. Each worker applies for one of the colleges, and each college admits one-and-a-half unit measure of its applicants who have the best high school performance. 2 Colleges A and B are ex ante identical, but ex post di¤erent in terms of student ability distribution.
Without the loss of generality I assume that college A is the superior college with the better average student ability in equilibrium.
Every worker ends up in one of the colleges because the total measure of admission from both colleges is equal to that of all workers. Once in college, workers decide how much time to spend studying. The college performance p c is determined in the same manner as in high school:
There is a networking e¤ect in college: job productivity of workers grows by fraction of the average student ability in their colleges. In other words, job productivity of a college s student increases by E ( js) (s = A; B). College friends at work can help each other to improve their job productivity. Moreover, one's job productivity increases even more if one's friends have better abilities. In this model the networking e¤ect coe¢ cient is the key parameter that decides which type of equilibrium exists.
Stage 3: Job Market
There are two …rms (or more) who have the same constant returns to scale technology: a college s graduate with ability produces + E ( js), that is, his innate ability plus the networking gain in college. Firms can observe each worker's college name and his rank in the college and compete for the worker by simultaneously announcing their wage o¤ers based on these two signals. The rank of a worker in a college is de…ned as the measure of the workers in the college who have strictly higher performance.
Equilibrium
A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the model consists of the list including each worker's study time and college choice and each …rm's wage schedule, such that every player's strategy is the best response to the other players' strategies and the …rms' beliefs are updated by the Bayesian rule whenever applicable. I focus on the following two types of equilibria in order to show the di¤erences in signaling stage and their impact on study hours and educational performance.
De…nition 1 Asian equilibrium is the Pareto-dominant separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium, where college A has only high and medium ability workers and college B has only medium and low ability workers.
each college has all three ability types of workers.
Note the following four points in the equilibrium de…nitions. First, a college name is a better signal of a worker's ability in Asian equilibrium. In Asian equilibrium, …rms can safely infer that college A graduates are at least of medium ability and that college B graduates are at best of medium ability. Second, speci…c shares of ability types within colleges do not matter for equilibrium classi…cation. What matters is whether certain ability types exist with a positive measure or not.
Third, the colleges in US equilibrium do not have to be identical. They may di¤er in their share of each ability type as long as each college has a positive measure of each ability type. Fourth, both equilibria are Pareto-dominant separating equilibria. It is a well known result that Spence signaling models produce a continuum of multiple equilibria. In order to obtain a unique outcome, most applied literature focus on the Pareto-dominant separating equilibrium outcome (or the Riley outcome). This equilibrium outcome is the only equilibrium outcome that survives the re…nement of D1 criterion (see Banks and Sobel (1987) , Cho and Kreps (1987) , Cho and Sobel (1990) ).
Colleges and Job Market
In this section, I start characterizing each equilibrium backward from the last stages: colleges and job market. This section has two key results. First, college students in US equilibrium work harder than their counterparts in Asian equilibrium. Second, the bene…t of attending the better college (college A) is greater in Asian equilibrium than in US equilibrium.
There are two standard results to check before characterizing college equilibrium outcome.
First, the single crossing property holds between college performance and wage. Higher ability workers need smaller wage compensation for the same marginal performance increase because it costs them less study time. Thus, higher ability workers can outrank lower ability workers by achieving performance that is too costly for the lower ability workers to imitate. Second, the …rms o¤er each individual worker the wage equal to his expected productivity based on the signals (college name and rank in the college) due to their constant returns to scale technology and Bertrand competition for workers.
Colleges in Asian Equilibrium
In Asian equilibrium, college A has one unit measure of high ability workers and a half unit measure of medium ability workers. In any separating equilibrium, high ability workers outrank medium ability workers and thus high ability workers get rank 0 and medium ability workers get rank 1.
Since …rms pay expected productivity based on the signals, …rms o¤er high ability workers'wage
M to college A graduates with rank 0 and medium ability workers'wage
M to college A graduates with rank 1.
In this Pareto-dominant (i.e., signaling-cost-minimizing) separating equilibrium, medium ability workers, the lowest ability type in this college, do not study at all P L A = 0 and high ability workers study just enough to weakly separate themselves away from medium ability workers. Therefore, high ability workers'performance P H A is determined by the medium ability workers'indi¤erence condition between their equilibrium pay o¤ and high ability workers'pay o¤:
Even though college A does not have any low ability workers in equilibrium, I still need to know how a low ability worker would behave if he deviated to college A, because he makes a college choice in high school. The low ability worker in college A would not perform better than medium ability workers because it costs him more study hours than it does medium ability workers to achieve the same level of performance. Since medium ability workers in college A do not study at all, the low ability worker would not study at all either P L A = 0 and get paid medium ability workers'wage with rank 1. Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium outcome in college A.
Ability
Performance Rank Wage College B has a half unit measure of medium ability workers and one unit measure of low ability workers in Asian equilibrium. Thus, medium ability workers get rank 0 and low ability workers get rank 1/2, and …rms o¤er wages
L to college B graduates with rank 0
L to college B graduates with rank 1/2. Low ability workers do not study at all P L B = 0 and medium ability workers study just enough to separate themselves away from low ability workers:
A high ability worker, if he deviated to college B, would not perform any better than medium ability workers because doing so would not give him any better rank. He would not perform any worse than medium ability workers either because it costs him less e¤ort to achieve the same level of performance. Thus, the high ability worker would achieve the same performance as medium ability workers in the college and get paid the medium ability workers'wage. Note that the high ability worker can not a¤ect the ranks of the other ability types in the college because he is of measure 0. Table 2 summarizes the college B outcomes. College B in Asian equilibrium is the place where the rank-signaling assumption in college performance makes a di¤erence. Suppose that …rms observe raw college performance directly. The high ability wokrer who deviated to college B can signal his true ability by achieving performance that is too costly or even impossible for medium ability workers to imitate. Firms should believe that workers with these performance levels are of high ability, following the idea of the intuitive criterion in Cho and Kreps (1987) . However, this is somewhat in con ‡ict with the belief created by
Bayesian update rule that college B has only medium and low ability workers in Asian equilibrium.
The rank-signaling assumption resolves this possible con ‡ict in belief by limiting the range of college performance that are observable to …rms: there are only two levels of performance 0 and P M B to either of which all other performance is observationally identical to …rms. Note that in equilibrium …rms do not have an incentive to directly look at workers'college performances because their college performances are perfectly inferable from their college names and ranks in the colleges.
Colleges in US Equilibrium
In US equilibrium, both colleges have all three ability types but with di¤erent shares. Suppose that college s has i s measure of ability type i workers (s = A; B and i = H; M; L). In college s, high, medium, and low ability workers get ranks 0, H s , and H s + M s respectively, and …rms o¤er wages H + E ( js), M + E ( js), and L + E ( js) to college s graduates with ranks 0, H s , and H s + M s . Low ability workers do not study at all, and the higher ability workers study just enough to separate themselves away from the lower ability workers. Table 3 summarizes the college outcomes in US equilibrium. Note that college performances P i s do not depend on college name s (i = H; M; L). The same ability workers perform equally in both colleges regardless of ability distribution as long as each college has all the three ability types with positive measures.
Asian Colleges vs. US Colleges
Now I compare Asian and US colleges outcomes. I …rst show that US students study harder than
Asian students in college. In Asian equilibrium college A graduates are considered at least of medium ability while in US equilibrium college A graduates can be of any ability type. This belief allows college A students in Asian equilibrium to study less in college to signal their ability, thus lowering their college performances. Since performance is an increasing function in study time, it follows trivially that college A students spend more time studying in US equilibrium. The following result can be easily obtained by comparing Tables 1 and 2 with Table 3 .
Proposition 1 Every college student studies weakly more hours and performs weakly better in US equilibrium than in Asian equilibrium. In particular, high and medium ability students in college A study strictly more hours and perform strictly better in US equilibrium.
The result in Proposition 1 is more generally true: students work harder in US equilibrium whenever the equilibria are fully separating and when the support of ability distribution within each college in an Asian equilibrium is strictly contained in the support of ability distribution within each college in a US equilibrium. 3 This result does not depend on the speci…c assumption about discrete types. Now I show that the bene…t of attending college A is greater in Asian equilibrium than in US equilibrium. In Asian equilibrium, there are two endogenous e¤ects that make college A preferable to college B. First, there is the "networking" e¤ect. The network productivity gain in college A is greater than the productivity gain in college B because the average ability of college A students is better than that of college B students. Second, there is a "sorting" e¤ect which makes college A even more attractive. The sorting e¤ect occurs because …rms believe that college A graduates are at least of medium ability and college B graduates are at best of medium ability.
3 I thank a referee for pointing this out.
In order to better understand this sorting e¤ect, suppose that there is no networking e¤ect ( = 0). Low ability workers prefer college A because they can make medium ability workers'wage by attending college A. Medium ability workers get the same wage whether they attend college A or college B, but still prefer college A because they do not have to study at all in college A. High ability workers prefer college A because they would make medium ability workers' wage if they attended college B. This sorting e¤ect can be veri…ed algebraically by comparing the outcomes in Table 1 and Table 2 with holding = 0.
In US equilibrium, the sorting e¤ect does not exist. In Table 3 the outcomes for both colleges are identical if the networking e¤ect does not exist ( = 0). The networking e¤ect still makes college A weakly preferable to college B, but the size of the networking e¤ect is smaller than that in Asian equilibrium because the average students' ability di¤erence between college A and B is bigger in Asian equilibrium. Thus, the bene…t of attending college A is greater in Asian equilibrium. 4 Proposition 2 The bene…t of attending college A is strictly greater in Asian equilibrium than in US equilibrium.
High School and the Existence of Equilibrium
In this section, I characterize equilibrium outcomes in high school. This section has three key results. First, high school students in Asian equilibrium study harder than their counterparts in US equilibrium. Second, workers in Asian equilibrium study harder in high school than in college while workers in US equilibrium study harder in college than in high school. Third, Asian equilibrium exists for a su¢ ciently large networking coe¢ cient and US equilibrium exists for a su¢ ciently small networking e¤ect coe¢ cient .
Firms do not directly observe workers' high school performance. Instead, the …rms observe workers'college names that are determined by their ranks in high school performance. The role of 4 The bene…t of attending college A is algebraically de…ned as v n this rank signaling assumption is to prevent complete signaling in high school stage by limiting the range of high school performances workers can choose: all workers choose either college A admission cut-o¤ performance C A or college B cut-o¤ C B because …rms care only about workers'college names.
If …rms directly observed workers'high school performances, high and medium ability workers would be able to signal their abilities in high school by achieving high school performances that are too costly for lower ability types to imitate. Note that in equilibrium …rms do not have an incentive to directly observe workers' high school performances because their high school performance are perfectly inferable from their college names.
High School in Asian Equilibrium
In Asian equilibrium, a half unit measure of medium ability workers attend college A and the other half unit measure of medium ability workers attend college B. More precisely, medium ability workers with < m , where F ( m ) = 0:5, attend college A because they have lower utility costs of achieving the cut-o¤ C A for college A admission, and medium ability workers with > m attend college B. A medium ability worker with m is indi¤erent between the two colleges, and this uniquely determines college A cut o¤ performance C A :
The college B cut-o¤ C B is 0 because college B is less preferred and there are enough seats to accomodate all workers. I can rewrite the above equation as
The college A cut-o¤ C A also has to satisfy the incentive compatibility conditions for the other types. In other words, the cut-o¤ C A has to be such that no high ability workers deviate to college B and no low ability workers deviate to college A. In order to show that no high ability worker deviates to college B, it su¢ ces to show that the high ability worker with the highest study disutility coe¢ cient doesn't deviate to college B. Analogously, I also need to show the low ability worker with doesn't deviate to college A.
Let R L A and R H A be the maximum high school performance levels which low ability workers with and high ability workers with are willing to achieve in order to attend college A. They are indi¤erent between attending college A with these reservation performances in high school and attending college B with 0 performance. Therefore, R L A and R H A are determined by
It follows from conditions (1) ; (2) ; and (3) that R L A , C A , and R H A converge to L , M , H respectively as increases to in…nity (note that college outcomes P H A and P M B do not depend on ), which implies that R L A < C A < R H A for su¢ ciently large . For these no low ability workers attend college A and no high ability workers attend college B, and thus there exists an Asian equilibrium.
Proposition 3 There exists an Asian equilibrium for su¢ ciently large .
The networking e¤ect plays a crucial role in Proposition 3. Without the networking e¤ect, the single crossing property may not hold in high school stage and thus there may not exist an Asian equilibrium. 5 However, as the networking bene…t, thus the bene…t of attending college A, becomes larger and larger, all types are prepared to spend a lot of hours studying, and higher ability workers eventually outperform lower ability workers because they have higher upper bounds on their performances.
High School in US Equilibrium
In order for a US equilibrium to exist, both colleges A and B should have all three ability types.
The heterogeneity in high school study disutility makes the existence of US equilibrium possible, 5 For example, when there is no networking e¤ect, the gains from entering the good college is higher for low ability types than for medium ability types. If low types get into the good college, they can pass o¤ as the medium types at no extra e¤ort. So the gain is Table 2 that
where some high ability workers with high attend the inferior college B and some low ability workers with low attend the superior college A. Therefore, in order for a US equilibrium to exist, the heterogeneity in has to be su¢ ciently large relative to the heterogeneity in ability.
Unlike Asian equilibrium, the ability distribution of workers across colleges in US equilibrium is not directly pinned down by the equilibrium de…nition but has to be endogenously determined.
Since the sorting e¤ect is not present in US equilibrium, the networking e¤ect is the entire bene…t of attending college A. Workers in high school observe the size of this networking e¤ect and decide which college to attend, aggregately determining the ability distribution of the workers across colleges. This new ability distribution, in turn, determines the size of the new networking e¤ect.
In equilibrium, the initial networking e¤ect has to coincide with the resulting networking e¤ect.
When the networking e¤ect coe¢ cient > 0 is …xed, the networking e¤ect is determined by the average student ability di¤erence between the colleges. This cross-college ability di¤erence x E ( jA) E ( jB) cannot be negative because college A students have better average ability.
Further, the cross-college ability di¤erence x is smaller than (2=3) 
Solving the above equation for~ i , I obtain
Those workers with lower than~ i (x; C A ) for each ability type attend college A and the others attend college B. Since college A admits one-and-a-half unit measures of workers, the cut-o¤ performance C A for college A is uniquely determined by the following condition:
The above condition implicitly de…nes C A as a function of x and thus I can write~ i (x; C A ) as
pins down the unique ability distribution across the colleges, the cross-college ability di¤erence (x) is uniquely determined (thus single valued) for x > 0.
So far I have assumed that is …xed when characterizing~ i (x) and (x). Since I want to relate to the existence of US equilibrium, I slightly modify the notations in order to follow the e¤ect of a change in on~ i (x) and (x). Let~ i (x; 0 ) and (x; 0 ) denote~ i (x) and (x) with = 0 respectively. The following lemma is crucial for analyzing the conditions determining the existence of US equilibrium. and that (b) (x; ) uniformly converges down to a ‡at line crossing the y axis intercept (note that (x; ) is weakly increasing in x due to part (ii)).
In US equilibrium, the initial networking e¤ect has to coincide with the new networking e¤ect resulting from workers' best-response college decisions. Therefore, the following condition has to hold:
Suppose x = 0. Condition (7) is satis…ed because 0 2 = (0), and there exists a trivial US equilibrium where all workers are indi¤erent between both colleges and each worker ‡ips a fair coin between them. In this trivial US equilibrium, each college has the same share of all three ability types. However, this trivial US equilibrium is not stable as de…ned in the following sense.
De…nition 3 Denote x n+1
(x n ) for all n 2 N. A US equilibrium with the cross-ability di¤ erence x is (locally) stable if there exists > 0 such that lim n!1 x n = x for all x 0 2
De…nition 3 is a usual de…nition of stability, that the system returns to the original equilibrium after small disturbances. The trivial US equilibrium at x = 0 is not stable, because y axis intercept y 0 of (x; ) is strictly greater than 0 and (x; ) is continuous in x due to parts (ii) and (iii) of The intuition behind Proposition 4 is the opposite to that of Proposition 3. Assumption 1 guarantees that low ability workers with outperform the high ability workers with when the bene…t of attending college A becomes su¢ ciently small.
Asian High School vs. US High School
Now I compare Asian and US high school outcomes. The bene…t of attending college A is greater in Asian equilibrium than in US equilibrium (Proposition 2) and thus workers in Asian equilibrium are willing to study more in high school to enter college A. This makes college A cut-o¤ performance higher in Asian equilibrium and average high school performance better there because high school students perform only as much as the cut-o¤ performance of the colleges they attend.
Lemma 2 Whenever both Asian and US equilibria coexist with the same parameters, the average performance of high school students is strictly better in Asian equilibrium.
Now I compare high school performance across US and Asian equilibria when networking e¤ect coe¢ cients are di¤erent but the other parameters are the same. Proposition 5 directly follows from Lemma 2 because the bene…t of attending college A becomes even larger as the networking e¤ect coe¢ cient increases.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the networking coe¢ cient of Asian equilibrium is weakly greater than that of US equilibrium (the other parameters being the same). The Asian equilibrium has strictly better high school performance than the US equilibrium.
These predictions are fairly weak because I expect that Asian equilibrium usually has a better high school performance even when Asian equilibrium has a lower than US equilibrium. The extreme ability distribution across colleges in Asian equilibrium, which strengthens the networking e¤ect, and the sorting e¤ect found only in Asian equilibrium are usually more than enough to compensate for the loss of the bene…t of attending college A resulting from low .
Rather surprisingly, it is not always true that workers in high school study more in Asian equilibrium even when they have better high school performance. In this model, only those attending college A study in high school. Since workers attending college A in Asian equilibrium have better average abilities than their counterparts in US equilibrium, they need less study time to achieve the same level of performance. It is thus possible that high school students work less in Asian equilibrium even when their performance is better. However, in most cases I expect high school students to work more in Asian equilibrium, as will be shown later in the simulation section.
High School vs. College
Now I compare study hours between high school and college within each equilibrium. In Asian equilibrium, the bene…t of attending college A increases to in…nity as the networking e¤ect coe¢ cient increases to in…nity. Thus, students work harder in high school than in college for su¢ ciently large . In US equilibrium, the bene…t of attending college A converges down to 0 as the networking coe¢ cient converges down to 0. Thus, students work harder in college than in high school for su¢ ciently small > 0.
Proposition 6 (i) In Asian equilibrium, students study more in high school than in college for su¢ ciently large .
(ii) In US equilibrium, students study more in college than in high school for su¢ ciently small > 0.
Simulation
In this section I run a simulation varying the networking coe¢ cient . The main purpose of this simulation is to show that there exist a range of s where both Asian and US equilibria coexist with the same parameters. In addition, the simulation also provides a concrete example illustrating how big or small the coe¢ cient should be for each theoretical result to hold. In the simulation, the networking e¤ect coe¢ cient varies from 0 to 0.9, and other parameters used in the simulation are the following:
Figure 2 summarizes the simulation result. First, di¤erent equilibria exist with di¤erent networking coe¢ cients . Only Asian equilibrium exists for large s and only US equilibrium exists for small s. Both equilibria coexist for medium-size s: Second, Asian students study harder in high school than in college while US students study harder in college than in high school. Moreover, high school students study harder in Asian equilibrium while college students study harder in US equilibrium. These are all consistent with the stylized facts. Figure 2 suggests that there are two di¤erent kinds of explanations, both consistent with the theory, for why US equilibrium occurs in the US and why Asian equilibrium occurs in East Asia.
The …rst explanation is a multiple equilibria argument. The second explanation is that East Asia and the US actually have di¤erent fundamental parameters, especially the networking e¤ect coe¢ cient . East Asia seems to have a higher .
Networking has been regarded as one of the most important factors to be successful in East Asia.
For example, in major …rms in Japan and Korea there are college alumni associations which promote the success of their members. Alumni connections are considered so important that they have their own names: "Gakubatsu" in Japan and "Hakbul" in Korea.
Empirical Evidence
This section provides empirical evidence. A testable implication of the theory is that high ability workers in East Asia should be relatively more concentrated among a few top colleges than their counterparts in the US. I examine this implication using college distribution data for the largest …rms'CEOs in the US and Korea.
The theory claims that college names are better signals of workers'abilities in East Asia than in the US. Its immediate implication is that students within an average US college should be more heterogeneous than students within an average East Asian college: US equilibrium has all three ability types within each college while Asian equilibrium has only two ability types. Although this conjecture seems quite plausible, this implication is hard to test due to data availability.
An equivalent testable implication is that high ability workers should be more concentrated in a few colleges in East Asia than in the US: Asian equilibrium has high ability workers only in college A while US equilibrium has high ability workers in both colleges. 
Discussion
There may be other explanations for the puzzle of why American students work harder in college than in high school while East Asian students work harder in high school than in college. This section discusses these alternative explanations and explains how they are related to my theory.
Cultural di¤erence
The di¤erence in study e¤ort pattern between the US and East Asia may be due to cultural di¤erence between the two regions: East Asian parents may be more interested in their children's education than US parents, and this makes East Asian students work harder in high school than in college because parents have more control over their children in high school than in college. This argument is plausible, but leads to another question of how the cultural di¤erence appeared and could have been sustained as an equilibrium.
This paper provides a microeconomic foundation for this cultural di¤erence: East Asian parents are obsessive about their children's high school performance because they know that college names matter tremendously in their children's life. In this respect, this paper is related to the literature on the microfoundations of cultural e¤ects (Cole et al. (1992) , Cozzi (1998) , Fang (2000) ).
Institutional di¤erence
The di¤erence in study e¤ort pattern may be due to institutional di¤erence across countries regarding college admission. First, the US may have a relatively bigger number of seats in colleges, and this may makes college admission less competitive so students work less hard in high school. It is well known that the US has one of the highest college enrollment rates in the world: A survey by UNESCO (2005) shows that the US college enrollment rate was 81 percent in the years 2002-2003. However, this is also true for some East Asian countries. The same survey shows that the South Korean college enrollment rate was 85 percent in the same period. 6 Second, US colleges may use more diverse admission criteria besides academic performance as compared with East Asian colleges, and this makes US high school students spend less time studying than their East Asian peers. This argument may explain why East Asian students work harder in high school than US students. However, the admission criteria argument alone does not explain why American students start working harder in college. Moreover, the argument does not explain the higher concentration of high ability workers (top CEOs) among a few colleges in East 6 Japan has a substantially lower college enrollment rate at 49 percent.
Conclusion
This paper proposes a signaling explanation for the puzzle of why American students study more in college than in high school while East Asian students study more in high school than in college.
Signaling occurs over time both in high school and in college, and the timing of signaling may di¤er across countries. Students work hard in the signaling stage determined by the society as a whole.
The model also shows why a signaling stage may di¤er across countries. The signaling stage is likely to be high school if networking is important for job performance. A testable implication of the theory is that East Asia has a greater concentration of high ability workers among a few top colleges, as compared with the US. I con…rm this implication using college education data for the largest …rms'top CEOs.
A Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1
A.1 Preliminary Results
Lemma A 1 (i) C A (x; ) is continuous and increasing in x for all > 0, and C A (x; ) is continuous and increasing in for all x > 0.
(ii) lim x&0 C A (x; ) = 0 for all > 0, and lim &0 C A (x; ) = 0 for all x > 0.
Proof. (i) C A is uniquely determined by conditions (4) and (5). C A (x; ) is continuous in x because F and i (x; C A ) are continuous. It follows from condition (4) that i (x; C A ) is increasing in x and decreasing in C A . In order to satisfy the condition (5), C A has to increase when x increases. Therefore, C A is increasing in x. Similar arguments show that for all x > 0 C A (x; ) is continuous and increasing in .
(ii) Suppose that lim x&0 C A (x; ) 6 = 0 for some > 0. It follows from condition (4) that 
A.3 Proof for part (ii) of Lemma 1
Proof. C A is continuous in x according to Lemma A1. I thus obtain from condition (4) that i (x; ) is continuous in x (i = H; M; L:) It follows from condition (6) that is continuous in x.
Lemma A2 implies that there will be weakly more higher ability workers in college A relative to lower ability workers as x increases. Therefore, is weakly increasing in x.
A.4 Proof for part (iii) of Lemma 1
Proof. Part (iii) of Lemma 1 directly follows from Lemma A5.
